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THE INCOMPLETENESS OF HUMANITY. ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
REFLECTIONS
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Abstract
Science, philosophy and theology may each legitimately claim that anthropology is 
their own field. In this paper I shall first develop some considerations of scientific kind 
especially about the evolution of the human being. Then, some relevant philosophical 
lessons are considered. In particular, it is dealt with the nature of intelligence and cul-
ture, their relationship with the biological dimension, the issue of self-canalization and 
the openness of the human being, whether or not we can speak of a biological species. 
Then, some philosophical and theological questions are raised. Finally, the possible 
future of humanity is discussed. 
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1. Introduction
Science, philosophy and theology have since long time (at least from the beginning 
of the 19th century) gone along separated paths, and each of these fields considers now 
specific problems as exclusively pertinent to its domain and requiring specialized 
method ologies. For instance, natural sciences consider the investigation on the causal 
mechanisms responsible for all phenomena that can be empirically investigated as its 
exclusive domain. Theology considers the problem of soul and the discourse on God 
in such a way. Philosophy views as its specificity the interpretation of philosophers and 
philosophical texts, epistemological problems and, in general, problems devoid of im-
mediate empirical contents but whose investigation method does not rely on any kind 
of Revelation either. All of this points of view are also to a certain extent true and these 
different claims are somehow justified. This situation can even be considered one of 
the most positive effects (the only one to my current knowledge) of the mentioned 
fracture among these three provinces of knowledge. Certainly, some negative conse-
quences cannot be denied. I mention a couple of them:
•	 Some	afferents	(in	general,	a	minority)	to	any	province	like	sometimes	to	make	in-
cursions into the other provinces without being equipped of the minimal methodo-
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logical tools and the necessary background knowledge. So, scientists sometimes will 
support the idea that evolution does deny the existence of God (Dawkins R., 1986; 
2006; Dennett, 1995), often without having idea, at an epistemological level, of 
what a disproof would look like in such a case, and without having even a remote 
understanding of what we are saying when we use the word «God». They often take 
some popular opinions diffused in followers of historical religions as expressing this 
idea. However, this is like taking what popular journals write and people say as the 
image of science. Others claim that science has substituted philosophy (Hawking, S. 
W. and Mlodinow, 2010) without having a specific philosophical background (what 
was certainly not the case, in the first half of the 20th century, for giants like Einstein, 
Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, to quote some) and often ignoring which kind of 
philosophical questions have been raised across the centuries (or knowing this from 
what newspapers and popular journals say). This is clearly amazing, since most of 
those scholars are accustomed in their disciplines to speak only of what they know. 
However, when they trespass the threshold of their field, most seem to forget this 
methodological commandment. In such a case, we must agree with Kant when he 
said that to deal with the ultimate questions is compulsory to human reason (Kant, 
1787, for instance the Preface to the 2nd edition). However, I would rather say that 
the postmodern updating of this is: to human unreasonableness. Also philosophers 
like to say their word on science and technology, in general with a considerable dis-
regard, since science appears to them to deal with issues that are «low profile», inca-
pable to touch the real high or serious questions (Hegel, 1817, especially the Intro-
duction; Heidegger, 1954), although, again, their knowledge about empirical 
sciences is mostly grounded on popularization, whose character is often precisely the 
incapability to grasp the fundamental issues that science raises (Auletta and Wang, 
2013). A significant group of philosophers (mostly those who are more sensitive to 
empirical investigations) simply delegitimize any inquiry on issues like free will, 
consciousness, and so on, for not speaking of any issue raised by theology. They ar-
gue that all of this stuff is the result of human «metaphysical» illusions (Wegner, 
2002 and Dawkins, 2006). To support this claim they argue that science has always 
nullified our beliefs based on common sense. This may be true, and I cannot deny 
that science has several times shown that assumptions of common sense are not al-
ways well grounded. However, it would be even a bigger error to reject any kind of 
experience on this ground. Science is specific and is not an ideological manifesto. 
So, if there are specific reasons for rejecting some of our assumptions, we are forced 
to make it. However, we shall not do it before such evidences have been found. So, 
although still some aspects of many problems need to be clarified, we are accus-
tomed in our scientific activity to take some facts as facts although we cannot clarify 
them completely, and not to reject them because we cannot clarify them completely. 
So the philosopher who likes to do this misses the fundamental sense of science. 
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Also theologians are not fully exempt from this temptation. Some try in fact to force 
philosophical arguments and empirical facts for accommodating what is known to 
what they presume to be true. They often forget that no believer can have a full 
understanding of God’s word, as it is clearly said in the Encyclical Providentissimus 
Deus with reference to the Fathers of the Church. If this is true, then it is much more 
difficult to use arguments a priori for dealing with matters that involve empirical 
knowledge. 
•	 The	opposite	attitude,	as	mentioned,	is	to	remain	closed	and	trapped	in	the	field	of	
pertinence but also to raise barrier against any kind of external influence. Let us 
understand more about the consequences of this behaviour. Philosophers and theo-
logians are particularly good in this strategy especially because they feel that science 
is more and more subtracting soil for their speculations. It is a strategy of with-
drawal that leads nowhere, since one day philosophers and theologians could dis-
cover that there is no longer a safe background for their speculations, at least because 
any human thought, if coherently formulated, can have, sooner or later, some con-
sequences on empirical facts or facts known through other means. Also scientists in 
general do not like the philosophers or the theologians intruding into their own is-
sues. Obviously, they publicly affirm that science is relevant to everybody and that 
everybody should learn it. However, if one does not pertain to one of the scientific 
schools, then he/she should avoid to interfere with the work of the true specialists. 
What is really amazing is that almost everybody pertaining to one of these three 
provinces of knowledge (even those who nominally are against) tries to use special-
ism and the acknowledged peculiarity of their methodology of investigation as a 
barrier. This is true also for philosophers and theologians: the first group is subdi-
vided in many schools and closed subgroups whose main activity is the quotation of 
works of other members of the subgroup in a explosion of self-referentiality. Their 
language is often incomprehensible to people working just in the adjacent field. 
However, theologians reach here a true climax when use an obscure language and 
make abuse of the word mystery, while true mysteries are such because they are ro-
bust to rational speculation, a fact that is impossible, however, to ascertain, if not 
seriously trying to penetrate them with reason. If otherwise, the suspicion could be 
legitimately advanced that one masks the limitations of one’s own inquiry as limits 
of the human reason. 
It seems much more reasonable to try to interact with people of the other provinces 
and try to learn something from each other (Auletta, 2013b). This could be of enor-
mous benefit to any of these provinces of knowledge, especially in a time of significant 
and quick change as our epoch is (Auletta, 2011b, Chaps. 1-2). In fact, there is a single 
field of investigation towards which any of the three provinces of knowledge could raise 
legitimate and justified claims of pertinence to their methodology of enquiry and ap-
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proach: anthropology (Auletta, 2011b Chap. 5). And by cause, since humanity is a so 
complex subject that necessarily requires different approaches and methods. However, 
we again assist to an amazing show: instead of cooperating, instead of learning from 
what the others have to say, the three provinces of knowledge try to isolate a subfield, 
and none considers that, in such a way, we have simply destroyed the object of investiga-
tion. There is, however, a partial exception that gives us a hope for the future. 
2. Human evolution in short.
2.1. A New Kind of Evolution.
The hope is represented by this circumstance: in recent years scholars trained in 
biology and scholars trained in cultural anthropology not only started to really interact 
but even to converge on some fundamental results. This not by chance and can deter-
mine a major change in the way in which we consider evolution. In fact, it is likely that 
the most general law of biological change and therefore of evolution is the following: 
those changes are preferred that can be made more down streams and therefore super-
ficially, since they provoke less fundamental consequences (resulting less dangerous) 
and happen quicker, what implies that should be a selective pressure in this sense (Au-
letta, 2011a Chap. 9, and 2013c). This is today widely acknowledged in developmen-
tal studies (Wilkins, 2002). Therefore, we could consider the history of life as an evolu-
tion of the mechanisms of inheritance and distinguish three main kinds of variations 
and inheritance according to the level at which they happen: (1) Variation of the ge-
nome that goes together with limitless multiplication of the descendants. Prokaryotes 
and low eukaryotes have favoured this strategy. (2) Changes in the selection mecha-
nisms, that is, of the interplay between environment and organism as well as between 
different species (construction of ecological niches) (Laland et al., 2000 and 2008). 
Multicellular organisms in particular have focused on this second strategy. Here, epi-
genetic variability (most of the relevant changes and accommodations need indeed to 
occur during development) is privileged, since it is the phenotype that is involved in 
niche construction. (3) Variance in the type of transmission, by finding alternative 
forms of transmission: cultural heritage. Culture is information capable of affecting 
individual phenotypes’ behaviour that they acquire from other conspecifics by teach-
ing or imitation (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Richerson and Boyd, 2005). As a result, 
some cultural variants spread and others diminish, leading to evolutionary processes 
that are as real and important as those that shape genetic variation: in other words, the 
mechanism is basically Darwinian although with a very specific character, as we shall 
see. Humans have adopted this third strategy, centred on cultural variability.
I wish to underlie three aspects of this convergence between biological and cultural-
anthropological studies: Gene-culture interaction, cultural reuse and embodiment. 
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2.2. Gene-culture interaction.
Researchers with diverse backgrounds are converging on the view that human evolu-
tion has been shaped by gene-culture interactions (Laland et al., 2010). Theoretical 
biologists have exploited population genetic models to demonstrate that cultural pro-
cesses can have a profound effect on human evolution, and anthropologists are inves-
tigating cultural practices that modify natural selection. Although genetic and ecologi-
cal models have proved that niche construction can affect evolutionary outcomes even 
when culture is absent and only epigenetic factors dominate (e.g. allowing the persis-
tence of organisms in inhospitable environmental conditions that would otherwise 
lead to their extinction), niche construction due to cultural processes can be more 
powerful, since it can significantly modify selection on human genes, with resulting 
effects on evolutionary outcomes. For instance, cultural niche construction may op-
pose or even nullify the effects of environmental change, protecting organisms against 
shifts away from environmental states to which they are adapted. In such a way, it 
buffers selection and helps to explain a lack of correspondence between human allele 
frequencies and selective environments (this effect is called decoupling). Recent analy-
ses of human genetic variation reveals in fact that hundreds of genes have been subject 
to recent positive selection, often in response to human activities (Thornton and Clut-
ton-Brock, 2011). Evidence for the relevance of gene-culture interaction is that selec-
tion has accelerated greatly during the last 40,000 years (Hawks et al., 2007). A known 
example is that dairy farming prompted the formation of the selective environment 
that favoured, in less than 10,000 years, the spread of alleles for adult lactose tolerance. 
It is also an interesting example of convergent evolution. Indeed, the gene encoding 
lactase that is associated with the ability to digest milk as adults in European people is 
called C/T-13910, but the genetic basis of lactase persistence in Africans, is constituted 
by three single-nucleotide polymorphisms (G/C-14010, T/G-13915 and C/G-13907) 
(Tishkoff et al., 2007). 
This clashes with the hypothesis that the observed age distribution of recent posi-
tively selected linkage blocks happens with a constant rate of adaptive substitution 
during human evolution. In fact, if gene expression changes were neutral they would 
not tend to accumulate in specific functional categories but, rather, would be ran-
domly distributed (Varki et al., 2008). The brain is obviously a very interesting organ 
in this context. Several nervous-system genes undergoing adaptive evolution at the 
protein level have been identified in humans, including genes involved in neurogene-
sis, hearing and developmental patterning. Since even stereotyped mammalian behav-
iours considered crucial for species survival, such as effective mothering, seem to re-
quire observational learning in primates, we must consider the possibility that hominids 
in general and humans in particular have partially escaped from classic Darwinian se-
lective control of some aspects of the genome, even in the form of genetic hard-wiring 
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of long-standing species-specific learned behaviours. This might in turn help to explain 
the unusual degree of exaptation (Gould and Vrba, 1982) displayed by the human 
brain. The advantages of such novel changes are flexibility, plasticity, more rapidly de-
veloping population diversity, and greater opportunities –but the disadvantages are 
that genomes cannot recover irrevocable losses, and cultural advantages can be sensitive 
to the turn of history and fate. 
In fact, interesting functional changes occur for genes involved in language appren-
ticeship. A point mutation in forkhead box P2 (FOXP2), a gene involved in human 
speech production, co-segregates with a disorder in a family in which half of the mem-
bers have severe articulation difficulties accompanied by linguistic and grammatical 
impairment (Varki et al., 2008). Apparent adaptive evolution of FOXP2 has indeed 
been reported in the human lineage. During the roughly 130 millions of years of evo-
lution that separate the common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees from the 
mouse, a single amino-acid change occurred in the FOXP2 protein. By contrast, since 
the human and chimpanzee lineages diverged about 4.6-6.2 millions of years ago, two 
fixed amino-acid changes occurred on the human lineage whereas none occurred on 
the chimpanzee and the other primate lineages, except for one change on the orangu-
tan lineage.
2.3 Mirror neurons and cultural reuse.
When we compare the human brain with that of other animals (in particular pri-
mates) we need to consider regions that present important analogies and perhaps ho-
mologies with other species. The classical model, dominating until the end of last 
century, relied on a strong modularization of the brain and therefore ended to assume 
that Broca’s and Wernicke’s language areas are specific to language and unique to hu-
mans. The consequence was a minimization of the possibility to understand a crucial 
issue like language origins through studies of animals or other cognitive systems (Au-
letta, 2011a, Chap. 23). However, neither Broca’s nor Wernicke’s area is devoted en-
tirely to language processing and, in fact, these substrates might not be human-specif-
ic at all (Fisher and Marcus, 2006). It is now generally accepted that language capacity 
involves a complex network of cortical and subcortical circuits that is broadly distrib-
uted across the brain. 
This field of study made a considerable progress with the discovery of mirror neu-
rons (Rizzolatti et al., 1990; Fogassi et al., 2005; Auletta, 2011a, Sec. 15.3). It was 
found that in monkeys’ cortex areas F1-F7 there were neurons that discharged when an 
action was performed and also when it was only observed. Mirror neurons are therefore 
active when the monkeys perform certain tasks, but they also fire when the monkeys 
watch someone else performing the same specific task. In particular, the neurons of 
area 6aβ are not influenced by the location of the object, nor whether it was grasped or 
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not. The brain activity changed before the arm movement and continued until the end 
of it. These developments can be understood as a clear evidence for the theory of motor 
cognition as far as they show that motion control and fine-tuning is crucial for acquir-
ing high cognitive abilities (Jeannerod, 2006).
The suggestion is that in humans we deal with an area here that is more linked to 
higher order cognitive processes rather than being a patch-like convolution of distinct 
and distinguishable subregions (Lindenberg et al., 2007). It is indeed activated and co-
activated in a variety of different motor and perceptive tasks involved in communica-
tion processes, and available evidence suggests that the temporal cortex is an ensemble 
of areas providing several general performances (Iacoboni and Wilson, 2006). Also 
from an evolutionary point of view, it is ascertained that the expansion and remodel-
ling of the temporal cortex was crucial for modern humans (Bruner et al., 2003).
Therefore, at the opposite of traditional idealizations, it appears that many struc-
tures are activated by different tasks across different task categories and cognitive do-
mains (Anderson, 2010). These results and the suggested new view of the way in which 
the brain works are the basis of one of the most accredited hypotheses about the origin 
of language: spoken language could derive ultimately from a previous gestural lan-
guage. In fact, human beings still have a set of primate calls that remains quite separate 
from our vocal language (Burling, 2005, 1-47). At the opposite, the rostral part of the 
monkey ventral premotor cortex (area F5) is the monkey homolog of Broca’s area in 
the human brain (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998). Human Broca’s area might also become 
active during the execution of hand or arm movements, during mental imagery of 
hand grasping movement (mostly area 44), and during tasks involving hand-mental 
rotations (areas 44 and 45). Sometimes, when the observed action is of particular inter-
est to a monkey, the premotor system will allow a brief prefix of the movement to be 
exhibited. This prefix will be recognized by the actor. Therefore, this fact will affect both 
the actor and the observer. The actor will recognize an intention in the observer, and the 
observer will notice that its involuntary response affects the behaviour of the actor. The 
development of the capacity of the observer to control his or her mirror system is crucial 
in order to (voluntarily) emit a signal. When this occurs, a primitive dialogue between 
observer and actor is established. This dialogue could constitute the core of language, 
where active (speaking) and passive (hearing) are continuously alternated.
Developing these ideas, Arbib hypothesized that language readiness evolved as a 
multimodal manual/facial/vocal system with protosign (manual-based protolanguage) 
providing the scaffolding for protospeech (vocal-based protolanguage), thus represent-
ing the «neural critical mass» to allow language to emerge from protolanguage as a re-
sult of cultural innovations within the history of Homo sapiens (Arbib, 2005, 2009; 
Arbib et al., 2008). The claim here is that the path to protospeech is indirect, with 
early protosign providing a necessary scaffolding for the emergence of protospeech. 
This led to what is known now as the mirror system hypothesis: the parity requirement 
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for language –that tells that what counts for the speaker must count approximately the 
same for the hearer– is met because Broca’s should be evolved atop the primate mirror 
system for grasping, with its capacity to generate and recognize a set of actions. A cou-
ple of comments are appropriate here. The parity requirement is certainly crucial for 
language but seems to be rather the effect of something more fundamental: the possi-
bility that an agent can modify its cognitive state or its behaviour through an action 
that is appropriate to that started by the partner. This seems to be the main difference 
between non-human primates and other mammals, which are provided with interac-
tive schemes but do not modify their initial state if not for the specific contextual pa-
rameters while the schemes themselves remain unchanged (Auletta, 2011a Chap. 12). 
Instead, it is likely that it is this ability to allow primates (and cetaceans) to give rise to 
higher forms of interaction, like local transmission of specific behaviours. Arbib argues 
that the first creatures who had a language-ready brain did not yet have language –just 
as he believes that our distant ancestors had brains that could support the ability to 
read long before any human culture developed a writing system. However, this state-
ment is not fully correct in the light of the cultural recycling theory that I support here. 
In fact, the transition from monkey-like action recognition (assumed to be shared with 
the monkey-human common ancestor) to human language, according to the author, 
should be accomplished in two steps: 1. Biological evolution: from a mirror system to 
a language-ready brain. 2. Cultural evolution: from hominids with a language-ready 
brain and rudimentary manual-vocal communication to humans with full language 
capability. However, we should take more into account the long history that brought 
our ancestors from an ape-like style of life to modern humans. This is the result of a 
crucial epigenetics-culture interaction. In fact, although the mirror neuron communi-
cation system has a great asset, since its semantics is inherent to the gestures used to 
communicate, the transition from this system to the human language may turn out to 
be more difficult than initially thought by the proponents of the mirror system hy-
pothesis. It is likely that the great leap from a closed system still bound to a small set of 
behaviours to a unlimited communicative mirror system depended upon the evolution 
of imitation (and related cognitive abilities) and the related changes of the human 
mirror-neuron system: the capacity of mirror neurons to respond to pantomimes and 
to intransitive actions that was absent in monkeys (Fadiga et al., 1995; Buccino et al., 
2004; Corballis, 2010). 
This justifies us to assume that neural circuits established for one purpose are 
commonly exapted (Gould and Vrba, 1982) (exploited, recycled, redeployed) during 
evolution or normal development, and put to different uses, often without losing 
their original functions. That is, rather than posit a functional architecture for the 
brain whereby individual regions are dedicated to large-scale cognitive domains like 
vision, audition, language, and the like, or to assume biological adaptations that 
were accomplished before cultural progresses, neural reuse theories suggest instead 
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that already existing low-level neural circuits are used and reused for various pur-
poses in different cognitive and task domains. This suggests that the functional dif-
ferences between cognitive domains should reveal themselves in the (different) ways 
in which the (shared) parts are assembled: although different domains do tend to be 
supported by overlapping neural regions, each task domain is characterized by a 
distinctive pattern of co-activation among the regions. At least four different and 
empirically supported theories of neural reuse have appeared. Two of these theories 
build on the core notion of the sensorimotor grounding of conceptual content to 
show how it could implicate many more aspects of human cognitive life: the «neural 
exploitation» hypothesis (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005) and the «shared circuits model» 
(Hurley, 2008). Two other theories suggest that reuse could be based on even more 
universal foundations: the so-called «massive redeployment» hypothesis (Anderson, 
2007) and the «neuronal recycling» theory (Cohen et al., 2000; Dehaene et al., 2002; 
Dehaene and Cohen, 2007). I wish in particular to briefly mention the latter studies 
for their relevance for this paper. The authors showed that writing apprenticeship 
(that cannot be older than 6,000 years) induces a reuse of a visual region of the brain 
that was originally devoted to perceive edges and squares. This is very interesting for 
several reasons:
•	 The	time	is	very	short,	what	shows	that	cultural	reuse	can	be	very	quick	(and	as	I	
have underlined this is an adaptive advantage). Note that this neural reuse is a devel-
opmental process that occurs only for alphabetic people. However, this suggests the 
possibility that what starts superficially as a cultural phenomenon can with the time 
be transferred to species-specific biological modifications (affecting foremost the 
developmental patterns themselves). This is quite the reverse relative to the idea that 
biological modifications happen always first. The evolution of language could be 
occurred in this way, especially the relatively recent last step of a vocal protolanguage 
that should not be older than 200,000 years (Auletta, 2013c).
•	 There	is	clearly	a	certain	analogy	between	the	objects	that	are	originally	perceived	by	
means of this visual area (edges and squares) and written character. How, we should 
understand this analogy? Those perceptual elements are certainly deprived of any 
semantic import and rather represent the way in which we represent our environ-
ment. However, as a matter of fact, all the earliest forms of writing that we know 
about were much more iconic than the writing we use today. Ancient Egyptian, the 
earliest Chinese writing, and Sumerian, the first well-developed written language of 
Mesopotamia, all relied on pictographs (Burling, 2005, 105-121). These offered an 
easy, though only partial, solution to the problem of representing, on clay or papy-
rus, the huge number of words in a spoken language, and even in the earliest surviv-
ing examples of writing, the pictographs were quite stylized. Therefore, written 
characters emerged from forms deprived of any linguistic meaning as such but par-
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ticularly apt to play the function of conventional signs. Such a (metaphoric or ana-
logic) transfer may throw light on the general mechanisms that allow the emergence 
of higher cognitive functions from lower functionalities. 
2.4. Embodiment.
The latter considerations introduce us to the problem of embodiment. In fact, the 
embodied approach to cognition is closely related with the cultural recycling hypo-
thesis and places a heavy emphasis on the idea that human mental representations of 
objects, events and many types of information we encounter arise from (and are linked 
to) our physical experiences interacting with the world. The first scholar to have clear-
ly pointed out this was the philosopher Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty, 1942; 1945; 
Auletta, 2001a: Sec. 24.4.). The starting point of his investigation was represented by 
the awareness that the organism is not like an instrument that responds to external 
stimuli (like a machine would do) as it contributes to constitute them: they could not 
be perceived without the organism’s motion and activity. He also understood that all 
things are always perceived on a background: Any percept is constituted in a context. 
The empiricist’s hypothesis of the constancy of the perception is in conflict with the 
experience. Ordinarily, one goes from a nebula to a more determined perception as 
perception is a solution to a previous problem. Therefore, at the opposite of the em-
piricist tradition, Merleau-Ponty stressed that association is never an efficient cause 
that provokes the response but it only makes an intention more probable or attractive. 
Also the similitude with past perceptions is not active without a certain form given by 
the present perception: the past (i.e. the conglomerate of previous experiences) does 
not act on the present but is rather evoked by the present consciousness, by an act of 
the mind. The first operation of attention is to build a perceptive field that one can 
dominate. These fields are new regions in the total symbolic world built through cat-
egorical and conceptual patches. Any new acquisition allows a new integration of the 
previous facts, and the consciousness builds itself as a synthesis of transitions. What is 
interesting here is both (i) the idea that there is a high-level cognitive (mental and 
symbolic) activity that must be acknowledged as crucial for human exploration of the 
world, and (ii) that this cannot be detached from the biological substrate. 
On this background, we can now understand gestures as the bridge between biologi-
cal world and semantics that is required for language. Gestures can be metaphoric 
when they map abstract ideas onto physical actions or features. The gestures them-
selves are not metaphoric; they convey physical features, movement or space. Rather, 
the metaphor is contained in the relation between gesture and speech, where speech 
communicates an abstract concept and gesture adds a physical element to the concept, 
often providing a link to an action that grounds the abstract language in physical expe-
rience (Cartmill et al., 2012). These considerations can turn out to be crucial from a 
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phylogenetic point of view in relation to the problem of the origin of language. Both 
action and gesture can affect the mental representation of actions and objects, but 
gesture’s ability to represent action offers a way to ground abstract ideas in concrete 
actions, and therefore could have been an evolutionary bridge. Gestures that repre- 
sent action are actions performed within an imagined world (or abstract space). When 
gestures simulate action on or by objects, the objects involved in the event must be 
represented mentally. Actions, on the other hand, are performed on the physical envi-
ronment. The objects they act on are present and do not need to be represented men-
tally. Thus, when we perform actions on objects, we are able to offload some properties 
of the task onto the environment. However, when we use gesture to represent action 
on or by objects, we must also rely on mental sensorimotor representations of the ob-
jects involved.
Thus, a good deal of thinking happens in interaction of brain and body with the 
world. The practices of imagination via environmentally coupled gesture permit peo-
ple to add motion to otherwise static external structures (Hutchins, 2008). What or-
ganizes human interactions with the world? The answer to this question is again repre-
sented by the high cognitive level: cultural-symbolic practices. Cultural practices 
organize interactions with the world first by providing the world with the cultural 
(symbolic) artefacts that comprise most of the structure with which we interact. Sec-
ond, cultural practices orchestrate our interactions with natural phenomena and cul-
tural artefacts that produce cognitive outcomes. What determines how the dynamics 
of the world are imagined? The answer partly lies again in cultural practices. The enact-
ment of embodied, non-symbolic (biological) representations, through which phe-
nomena are seen as instances of culturally meaningful events and objects, is a cultural 
practice, not a passive innate process. And this is essential, because the existence of 
symbolic processes requires both a special set of practices for being aware of symbols as 
symbols and a set of practices for enacting the representations with which symbols can 
be associated. Imagining interactions with the world takes place both online (while the 
interactions are taking place in the present world) and offline in memory and anticipa-
tion (when the world is imagined). The offline imagination of enacted representations 
is a very powerful cultural practice.
Linguists have since long shown that several abstract concepts are indeed meta-
phoric transpositions out of physical and even spatial representations, in accordance 
with the theory of embodied cognition (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987). 
However, as mentioned, we should not understand this relation unilaterally: there is in 
fact a huge feedback of the functions on the old ones, otherwise the hypothesis of cul-
tural reuse makes no sense at all. Humans are peculiar, compared with non-human 
species, in the extent to which they try to «improve» their habitual environment. To 
make such improvements, particularly in our modern urban environment, we make 
and use various kinds of tools and technologies, and often the tools themselves are in-
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corporated into the fundamental structure of the environment to create a distinctive 
human ecological niche: the cultural-symbolic one (Iriki and Taoka, 2012). Humans 
indeed reshape and even invent environments in which they dwell. When considering 
tools, we can establish the hierarchical structures of (i) motor tools, (ii) sensory tools, 
and (iii) brain tools, which resemble the hierarchy of representations from indexical 
(motor) to iconic (sensory) to symbolic (brain) structures of development. Non- 
human animals rarely use the class of «sensory tools». In monkeys, previous studies 
have demonstrated that they can be trained to use a sort of endoscope only after having 
acquired an ability to use a motor tool (a rake). This training must imply the ability to 
reorganize the image of the body to one in which the rake is incorporated as an exten-
sion of the forearm. The body image is thought to form by integrating somatosensory 
and visual information relating to the body. Thus, its modification after tool use could 
be physically observed as changes in the receptive field properties of the neurons that 
code such images –when the tool was incorporated, the receptive field that codes the 
image of the hand was elongated to include the rake. This modification seemed to 
match the monkeys’ internal states, whether or not the rake was incorporated into the 
image of the forearm. Here, an equivalence is established between body parts (hands) 
and tools. These representations of the body image first comprise an internal model of 
the bodily structures used to control various movements, as a concrete neural correlate 
of the «indexical representation». This is the basic level. As the training proceeds fur-
ther, we might postulate that the monkey’s mode of representation may advance to 
rudimentary «iconic (visual)»: the class of sensory tools comprise a higher layer, super-
imposed onto previously acquired motor tools as the fundamental layer. Indeed, the 
history of our own technology suggests that sensory tools appeared much later, after 
motor tools were incorporated into human cultures. 
Is the neural plasticity depicted above limited within the range of the individual’s 
learning capacity, or could it cumulatively evolve over generations? Although the latter 
has a flavour of Lamarckism –inheritance of acquired phenotypic traits– there may be 
a biological mechanism that could channel the evolution of adaptations to an environ-
ment in which cultural information is embedded (Iriki and Taoka, 2012). Since mon-
key intraparietal neurons that normally code body image can be trained to code a tool 
in a way that is equivalent to that for the hand holding it, these neurons are bistable or 
polysemous for the hand or the tool. This functional plasticity may be an inherent 
property at the margins of a neural coding system prepared for gradual elongation of 
the arm during body growth, and which can then also adapt to a «sudden elongation» 
by using the tool. The posterior parietal areas responsible for these novel forms of cog-
nition are not necessarily clearly segregated, either in monkeys or in humans, and this 
suggests a trend of gradual expansion towards the lateral sulcus as the level of abstrac-
tion increases. Thus, it seems that the parietal area gradually incorporated high-order 
cognition as it expanded during hominid evolution, while preserving its original prin-
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ciples of operation. This could be an example of exhibiting a novel cognitive niche by 
reusing the functions that have derived from a polysemic mechanism described previ-
ously. This accidentally established equivalence between body parts (hands) and tools 
in turn leads to additional (iconic) polysemic and bistable interpretations, i.e. hands 
may be extended into the tool representation (externalization of the innate body) or 
tools may be assimilated into the body schema (internalization of external objects): this 
double process of internalization/externalization is constitutive for all symbolic activi-
ties (Auletta, 2011a: Chaps. 19 and 24). This newly acquired bistable state enables the 
reuse of cortical systems for different functions in the future, as in the case of tool use, 
perhaps in combination with other parts of the brain. This bistability, or «polysemy», 
could enable the use of metaphors in conceptual structure –so as to comprise a novel 
cognitive niche. In addition, because hominin species have attained an unusually long 
post-reproductive lifespan, particularly females, accumulation of knowledge continues 
over the whole lifespan of an individual, tending to peak in middle-to-old age. Species 
with a long lifespan –such as primates, and most typically humans– and low birth rate 
survive through an individual capacity to adapt. We need therefore to correct the spa-
tialization hypothesis (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980): spatial metaphors are only one source 
(coming from the indexical and most basic stage); the other source is represented by 
emotional-internalization hypothesis, according to which tools become our own prolon-
gation and extension, corresponding to the iconic stage: a stock as a metaphor of a good 
leg for walking when too old to make it alone and therefore possessing also a physical 
equivalence with a human limb.
3. Human intelligence
3.1 From a biological point of view
One central and distinguishing innovation in human evolution has been the dra-
matic increase in the use of contingent information for the regulation of improvised 
behaviour that is successfully tailored to local conditions (Tooby and DeVore, 1987). 
The cognitive niche is a loose extension of this concept, based on the idea that in any 
ecosystem, the possibility exists for an organism to overtake other organisms’ fixed 
defences by cause-and-effect reasoning and cooperative action –to deploy information 
and inference, rather than particular features of physics and chemistry, to extract 
resour ces from other organisms in opposition to their adaptations to protect those re-
sources. Improvisation puts humans at a great advantage: instead of being constrained 
to innovate only in (the long) phylogenetic time, they engage in ontogenetic ambush-
es against their antagonists –innovations that are too rapid with respect to evolutionary 
time for their antagonists to evolve defences by natural selection (Cosmides and Tooby, 
2000). As mentioned, it is selection itself to push more and more towards surface so-
COMPENDRE_VOL_16_1.indd   39 09/05/14   07:32
40 THE INCOMPLETENESS OF HUMANITY. ANTHROPOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS
Gennaro Auletta
p. 27-59
lutions, i.e. those that require less time and phylogenetic costs to be implemented. 
Although social interactions may have played a role, according to the Cosmides and 
Tooby, social competition was the initial driving force behind the evolution of human 
intelligence, as in the Machiavellian hypothesis (Byrne and Whiten, 1988; 1997): as-
tute selfish behaviour of primates could have been crucial for the establishment of 
human society. For situation-specific, appropriately tailored improvisation, the organ-
ism only needs information to be applicable or «true» temporarily, locally, or contin-
gently. If information, to be useful, only needs to be true temporarily, locally, and situ-
ationally, then a vastly enlarged universe of context-dependent information becomes 
potentially available to be employed in the successful regulation of behaviour. This 
enlarged universe of information can be used to fuel the identification of a more varied 
set of advantageous behaviours than other species employ, giving human life its distinc-
tive complexity, variety, and relative success. In other words, solutions are judged for 
their rationale. But what could possibly be useful about fictive, counterfactual, or im-
agined worlds –that is, about false or indeterminate information? The issue is to grasp 
what means information immediately hidden to us (Auletta 2001a: Chap. 18). For 
instance, we experience only the effects of a force but the latter remains hidden to us 
and must be therefore imagined and inferred. Another example is to penetrate the 
minds of the others. Likely, Homo Heidelbergensis and its contemporaries (about 
500,000 years ago [500 kya]) had already developed these capabilities. In fact, I recall 
the change in its way of life: the hunt of big mammals, which by definition did not 
constitute a specific adaptation, jointly with many other consequences (movable 
camps, clothing, building of spears, figurines, use of pigments, and so on). Summing 
up, we need to distinguish two related meanings of intelligence (Cosmides and Tooby, 
2002). The authors call these dedicated intelligence and improvisational intelligence. 
Dedicated intelligence refers to the ability of a computational system to solve a prede-
fined, target set of problems. Improvisational intelligence refers to the ability of a com-
putational system to improvise solutions to novel problems. Improvisational intelli-
gence is achieved by an architecture that is essentially a blank slate connected to 
general-purpose (content-independent, domain-general) reasoning and learning cir-
cuits. Clearly, to be able to recycle brain areas for other, high-level, cognitive functions, 
intelligence cannot be dedicated. 
In general, organisms can evolve two ways of responding to habitat change (Potts, 
1998): by mobility or dispersal, i.e. ways of tracking a preferred (specific) habitat or 
key resource. The second possibility is to broaden the range of conditions in which an 
organism can live. According to the three forms of variation stated previously, adaptive 
flexibility can be achieved: (a) by genetic polymorphism, in which alternative alleles 
confer different phenotypic and adaptive benefits, (b) by widening the norm of reac-
tion (Gould and Lewontin, 1979; Gupta and Lewontin, 1982) (in this case, exposure 
to diverse environments during growth and maturation elicits a range of epigenetic 
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responses and phenotypes from a single genotype); (c) by complex structures or behav-
iours that are designed to respond to novel and unpredictable adaptive settings. The 
result is an eventual decoupling of the organism from any one environmental state. 
Key hominid adaptations, in fact, emerged repeatedly during times of heightened var-
iability. 
3.2 What is the mind for?
One of the main issues here is when, how, and where mind could be effective for 
action (Auletta, 2001a, Chap. 18). M. Jeannerod pointed out that it is a question of 
when the conceptual import is present (Jeannerod, 2006): In higher cognitive process-
ing only, or already in motor representations. All action representations anticipate the 
effects of a possible action. However, neurological studies have also questioned the role 
of mind in its specific conscious modality of action from two points of view:
•	 Consciousness	of	action	is	a	slow	and	lengthy	process,	which	can	only	appear	if	ad-
equate time constraints are fulfilled. As such, consciousness is not likely to play a 
causal role in triggering the action, simply because it comes too late. 
•	 In	the	context	of	the	actual	action	execution,	the	latter	is	bound	to	signals	arising	
from the completion of the action itself, not to central signals that arise prior to the 
action. It is therefore tempting (and to a certain extent also right) to say in accord-
ance with Haggard that consciousness is an immediate consequence of the brain 
processes which prepare action, so that intention is a conscious correlate of prepara-
tory neural activity (Haggard, 2005).
We can take the following result of these studies for granted (Blakemore and Frith, 
2003): being aware of a goal is not being aware of how it is reached. Visuomotor rep-
resentations involved in motor acts lack conceptual contents and are not conscious. 
Interesting studies show that intentional and conscious processes tend to temporally 
shorten the time delay between the onset of the cause (for instance, pressing a certain 
key) and the onset of the effect (for instance, an auditory signal) (Haggard et al. 2002). 
However, this is a natural consequence for mammals, since our perception of causality 
is rooted in understanding the consequences of our own actions, which shows that the 
problem is likely to be not with consciousness as such. It is also well known that we 
may feel a stroke or a contact on a rubber arm that we see instead of our hidden arm 
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998).
As a consequence, the forms of disambiguation can be complex and the issue of 
consciousness can be very tricky. Kinesthesia or haptic cues in some cases tell us about 
ownership (this moving arm is mine) but not agency (I am the one who is making this 
arm move) (Jeannerod, 2009). This is nicely shown by a series of experiments origi-
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nally performed by Nielsen (Nielsen, 1978), in which subjects believed that they were 
following the motion of their own hand, while in fact (thanks to a mirror reflection) 
they followed the movements of the hand of an experimenter, which deviated more or 
less from the subject’s instructions. Actually, subjects, to compensate for these devia-
tions, deviated their own movements in a direction opposite to that of the hand which 
they could see. However, they were unaware of their compensatory movement. Similar 
results were found in experiments on the control of voice. 
Since the sense of discrepancy in the attribution of movements is fundamental in this 
kind of experiments, all these data could be sufficiently accounted for in terms of a de-
fault configuration in which motion is self-attributed if the effects are exactly those that 
have been expected given certain previous action planning. However, when there is a 
certain discrepancy, the subject must search for another explanation. As a matter of fact, 
it would be difficult to attribute a concrete movement to a certain agency given that the 
effects discussed above are related to the unconsciousness of intentions in action.
Further experiments performed by Fourneret, and Jeannerod have confirmed that 
subjects may be conscious of a goal but not of motor performances and therefore they 
would not be conscious of the way to achieve it or of the needed performance (Fourn-
eret and Jeannerod, 1998): It is a dissociation between the planning level and the ex-
ecutive level. Slachewsky et al. pursuing this line of study, showed that subjects may 
become aware of an abnormal deviation from the willed trajectory (due to distortion 
effects) only when the discrepancy passes a certain threshold, for instance an angle >14β 
when tracing lines with a pen on a paper (Slachewsky et al. 2001). This confirms the 
fact that consciousness is always triggered by some failure originating in the sensory 
data or in the accomplishment of a movement. Conscious experience about one’s 
movement deals with the later matching of two sorts of data: Central and peripheral 
signals. 
In conclusion, it seems that the conscious mind is not a causal agency at all. If we 
are speaking of the production of programmed movements, this conclusion is justified. 
However, the distinction between primary or prior intentions and intentions in action 
(Anscombe, 1957; Searle, 1983) allows for a different evaluation of consciousness even 
in its anticipatory quality. Indeed, if consciousness is bound by prior intentions and 
long-term plans, it presents itself as an integration system able to frame different spe-
cific actions into a wider context of planning. If so, it may be able to determine the 
general conditions in which a specific act (and therefore an intention in action) comes 
into play. Top-down causation of endogenous cognitive processes requires in fact that 
some representation of the goal precedes the action that is aiming at achieving the goal, 
as suggested by Jeannerod’s studies showing a hierarchy of body motions, such that the 
subsegments are nested in larger motor segments (like Russian dolls) (Jeannerod, 2006; 
2009; Auletta et al., 2013). However, it does not require a dynamical intervention 
from the higher level into the lower level of the hierarchy (Auletta et al., 2008; Auletta, 
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2012). In this way, the will can determine the equivalence class to which several con-
crete actions (and intentions in action) and means belong. This equivalence class is 
determined by the general goal of the primary intentions and by its subgoals. Then, 
when dealing with goals and intentions it does not matter how they are executed, it is 
only their final outcome representing the goal that is of concern. Thus, the specific way 
in which an action is performed is not controlled by consciousness, but its functional 
value is. In other words, prior intentions are teleologic, while intentions in action are 
based on teleonomic circuits that do not need to be explicitly purposeful or even goal-
directed (Auletta, 2013b). If I am right, consciousness could be a causal agency of ac-
tions but only in an indirect and constraining sense, and not in a direct and dynamic 
sense, as J. Searle still assumed. Moreover, this constitutes the conscious self as an actor 
able to plan for relative long time spans.
If I am right, a mentalist description would very easily account for facts like turning 
a page when reading (and understanding) a book, since the page is turned (a physical 
action in itself ) according to the ability to follow semantically (rationally and con-
sciously) what is written; or actions like running out of a building believing (a con-
scious interpretation, at least in some cases) that it is on fire. So, these acts represent 
what can be physically performed in infinite different ways (equivalence class of execu-
tions), where each combination of an action’s sub-segments would give an entirely 
different causal chain as a result. Nevertheless, those physical actions are still consi-
dered as instances of the same purposeful act. From this point of view, we can say that, 
to a certain extent, all physical events are intrinsically ambiguous unless they are not 
inserted in some semantic context. 
3.3 What Do Symbols Mean
There is a crucial difference between signs (used by all known living creatures, hu-
man included) and symbols. Communication signs (like the gestures that accompany 
our speech) are associative and not voluntary but directly connected with biological 
(perceptual and motor) schemata and representations: in general they have been phy-
logenetically selected (Auletta, 2001a, Chap. 12). At the opposite, the main characters 
of symbols are (Auletta, 2001a, Chap. 18):
1. They provide no direct representation. This is why they need to have a biological 
substrate and be socially shared. 
2. Are codified: a small and fixed number of units like letters, numbers, gestures con-
stitute the pool out of which communicative sequences are generated. The elements 
of the code need to be physically implemented. 
3. Are recursive and hierarchically organized (relative independence of each level of 
containment) (Hauser, 2009). 
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4. As a consequence of the latter two aspects, we have the property of discrete infinity, 
which is exhibited in its purest form by the natural numbers (Chomsky, 2000; Stud-
dert-Kennedy, 2003), i.e. the capacity to produce infinite «sentences» by combina-
tion of discrete units (phonemes, words, ritual gestures, etc.). This is what grounds 
the cumulativity of human culture. 
5. They are contrastive. For instance, the concept of finite can only be understood in 
opposition to that of infinite and vice versa. 
6. They have 3 components: pragmatic (social-cultural practice), syntactic (rules for 
combination), semantic (networks of meanings).
Symbols could not exist without the rich biological substrate of categories that we 
basically share with other primates. This is what makes the essence of embodied cogni-
tion. In fact, without such an embodiment, symbolic systems (and especially seman-
tics) could be closed worlds unable to be helpful to our species. Then, according to the 
view proposed here (reuse and cognitive development of a neural-biological substrate 
that we share with other primates) the actual symbol structures of a given language add 
cognitive value by complementing (without being replicated by) the more basic modes 
of operation and representation rooted in the biological brain (Clark, 1997; 2006). We 
should try to think in terms of a kind of complex dynamics in which the forms and 
structures of a language understood as a material symbol system play a key and irreduc-
ible role. In fact, the symbolic dimension is strictly connected with a system of mate-
rial elements playing the role of codifying units. Understanding language as a comple-
mentary cognitive resource is an important part of understanding human cognition as 
involving a complex interplay between internal biological resources and external non-
biological resources in terms of an extended mind. In over words, the external world 
appears here as the receptacle of information that can be used by humans. A critical 
issue then is how to mediate between inside and outside, between things in a pure 
form, and «mind» as it emerges out of and constrains processes in the brain (Roepstorff, 
2008). The idea is that the symbolic environment (very broadly construed) can some-
times impact thought and learning not by some process of full-translation, in which 
the meanings of symbolic objects are exhaustively translated into an inner code, a 
mentalese, but by something closer to coordination. On the coordination model, the 
symbolic environment impacts thought by activating such other resources and by us-
ing either the objects themselves (or inner image-like internal representations of the 
objects) as additional fulcrums of attention, memory and control. In the maximum 
strength version, these symbolic objects quite literally appear as elements in represen-
tationally hybrid thoughts.
The fact that symbols have a pragmatic component (social sharing) allows the con-
nection between the other two dimensions of symbols, semantics and syntax (Auletta, 
2001a, Chap. 19):
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•	 Semantics	consists	in	the	(class)	relations	among	concepts	and	eventually	class	ele-
ments. Semantics is based on both linearity and hierarchical principles since each 
semantic unit is connected with many other semantic units according to those hier-
archical class relations (Deacon, 1997, 69-101). Moreover, to linearly add (without 
making use of syntactic relations) semantic units is a way of getting new higher-
level semantic units (like: Lion sleep forest), as is evident in pidgin languages, in the 
way children speak, or also when adults try to express themselves in a language they 
do not know very well. Semantically interpreted items are easier to remember. 
•	 Syntax	is	related	to	the	hierarchical	combinatorial	principle	of	which	I	have	spoken	
above. For instance, in natural languages syntax tells you that a way of getting a cor-
rect proposition is to combine a subject, a verb, and a predicate in a certain way. It 
is very important to stress that a semantic combinatory of items like concepts does 
not exist (a phrase is not a semantic unit!). All combinatory are rather of syntactical 
nature. It is obviously possible to combine concepts in order to give rise to fictional 
entities. However, any such combinations (e.g. science fiction novels), if it is not 
meaningless (a random patchwork), is only so because we have inserted notions 
whose source is ultimately experience and not semantics (as it happens when we 
linearly add words). This is an important difference relative to syntactic combina-
tory, which is fully independent from experience. 
•	 Through	pragmatics	we	get	the	connection	with	the	representational	aspect	and	in	
this way we eventually relate concepts (which are types) to tokens. In other words, 
symbols do not refer directly to objects but to representations (without expressing 
their content), and only through representations are they connected with objects. 
They are therefore meta-representational in their fundamental nature. Moreover, in 
evoking representations in the partner (through an interactive dialogue), they are 
intrinsically active and interactive in the sense that they stimulate decisions in the 
partner. Pragmatics is based on the linearity principle, since it shows that a certain 
sequence of symbols (phonemes, letters, and so on) that is concretely uttered is 
mapped to semantics, and that their specific uttered combination is made according 
to a syntax. 
3.4 Intentionality and Projectuality
It is very difficult to understand symbol using without intentionality (Auletta, 
2001a, Chap. 20). Brentano introduced the concept of intentionality into modern 
philosophy and psychology (von Brentano, 1874). He understood intentionality as 
being related to an object and its properties. Since properties express the conceptual 
way in which we understand something, it was also assumed that the intentional object 
is immanent to the intentional act itself (it is not an external reality). Through the 
phenomenological school, intentionality was considered in increasingly psychological 
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and inter-subjective terms (Chisholm, 1957; 1976). In this way, intentionality assumes 
the characteristics of a symbolic activity, since I have said that symbols are socially re-
ferred to representations and not directly to external objects: they are meta-representa-
tional. To avoid any confusion, I use the term reference to express the (biological) re-
lation that organisms maintain with external objects when they represent them, whereas 
intentionality specifically means the symbolic sharing of actions and representations 
among humans, so that through these a reference to objects is also established. Inten-
tionality is therefore the foundation of the pragmatic aspect of the symbolic activity.
A significant progress was done by J. Searle (Searle 1983), who was relatively iso-
lated in the community of cognitive scientists, most of them skeptical towards inten-
tionality. Searle also noticed that intentional states represent objects and states of affairs 
in the same sense as speech acts do; both in fact have conditions of satisfaction and a 
direction of fit. Indeed, according to Searle, every intentional state consists of a repre-
sentational content in a certain psychological mode:
•	 A	specification	of	the	content	of	intentionality	is	already	a	specification	of	the	con-
ditions of satisfaction (the conditions under which there is a fit between mind and 
world).
•	 The	direction	of	fit	is	mind-to-world,	while	the	direction	of	causation	is	world-to-mind.
Intentional components and conditions of satisfaction can also be separated, as hap-
pens in hallucinations, anesthesia, electric stimulation of a certain cortical area, and so 
on. According to Searle, when we have true intentionality, the prior intention causes 
the whole action, which also comprehends the intention in action and the bodily 
movement, even if this relationship of causation is not immediately perceived and does 
not constitute the object of these experiences. However, this is not necessarily the case, 
so that we can still have intentionality playing a causal role even if motor aspects do not 
depend on it.
Primates understand both relational categories and third-party social relationships. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that chimpanzees are able to understand all of 
the following elements that are required for intentionality (Tomasello, 2008):
1. Others have different relationships to the same object, for instance being able to see 
or not see a given object (behavior understanding), 
2. Each of these perspectives can be gained by imagining how things would be when 
being in the place of others (empathy), 
3. Others have beliefs about things that may differ from our own (mind-reading).
 
Indeed, intentionality is not only the understanding of others’ intentions but the 
ability to cope with the other’s intentions in order to actively produce some joint ef-
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fects (Fogassi et al., 2005). As a matter of fact, when children start to speak (when they 
are about one year old), they follow always the gaze of the person who is speaking in 
order to converge on a common object or actively search for eye contact. 
3.5 Self-canalization
Once a true codified symbolic system has arisen, other further possibilities of codi-
fication and information-preserving and -sharing become feasible in principle, like a 
written language, internet, and so on. All these forms may have significant back-effects 
on dealing-with-information and therefore represent a process of self-canalization (Au-
letta, 2011b; Sec. 5.4). By self-canalization I mean the particular process by which 
human beings voluntarily subject themselves to rules, practices, learning processes, and 
so on, that are able to direct their development along a certain path as well as to cana-
lize future generations. This is the way in which we humans continuously generate 
variety and search for novelty by simultaneously accepting constraints that ultimately 
restrict that space of possibility. Such a process goes much further than the material or 
educational aspect of culture and touches the intellectual and moral sphere very deeply. 
Indeed, this high level of integration is what constitutes the mind and its operations, 
whose most perfect example is language. It is very important to understand that cul-
ture is the first system of self-canalization of a biological species that we know. In fact, 
phylogenetically, only teleonomic processes are at play. Instead, in this new form 
of phylogenetic inheritance, teleologic processes are also deeply intermingled with tele-
onomic ones, as is evident with teaching. 
We can envisage the human mind as an emergent process from biological evolution 
according to emergent monism (Auletta, 2011b; Sec. 3.3). This means that the mind 
cannot be a sort of detached substance, or a «super-instance» relative to the brain. In-
deed, brain processes are not generated by the mind: as we have seen, most of our op-
erations are performed in a spontaneous way by our brain without any rational plan-
ning or conscious intervention. What the mind can do, instead, is to establish rational 
plans, concepts, values, and so on, as general frameworks in which those spontaneous 
operations take their course. In other words, the mind rather than generating such 
processes can impose certain limitations and even block them thus redirecting their 
spontaneous course. The way in which the mind is able to canalize the brain opera-
tions is by resorting to physical events occurring outside the brain and by treating 
them in informational terms thanks to the pragmatic dimension (Auletta, 2011a; 
Chap. 24): vocal emissions, gestures, physical objects, or any other kind of structure 
or item can be combined by the mind in pure physical terms but according to syntac-
tic rules that are not physical themselves. This means, as understood by Merleau-
Ponty, that the mind throughout the whole of the person’s brain and body takes an 
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active part to the dynamical interactions occurring in the physical world to which the 
person pertains as a material entity and uses this as a way of conditioning its own neu-
ral processes.
However, this is achieved without violating the closure of physical laws and, as said, 
by having rather a constraining influence on the physical dimension (self-canaliza-
tion): the human mind is both the highest result so far of a process of growing com-
plexification and canalization of nature, and the way for exerting a new, original, active 
canalization of the physical world. This is also the manner in which a new connection 
between the physical and the mental worlds is established as well as a connection be-
tween the formal and the mental dimensions is realized. Let us consider the latter 
point.
Within the general cognitive interest of the present paper, we may say that when-
ever one has to admit that the results of an intellectual research are not depending 
solely on human efforts, that the natural world’s features encountered or discovered 
show universal validity, one also acknowledges (at least implicitly) the limit of our 
knowledge. In fact, the mind is able to establish a unique connection with the formal 
world of ideas and concepts. The way in which we humans arrive at certain conclusions 
is contingent, but when particular results of general validity have been found, we are 
no longer in the position to change something in these formal constructs according to 
our arbitrary will. It is true that we can excogitate new classes of objects that do not 
obey acknowledged laws or possess unexpected characters. However, this or that new 
class of objects also exerts certain constraints (simply due to the fact that these objects 
share certain properties), so that the game goes on. Yet, it may still be legitimate to 
ask: what forbids us to think that it is precisely this never-ending process that shows 
that contingency is the last word, and that the constraints we always find are them-
selves contingent and provisional? In a word, the fact that, in this game, our under-
standing grows, science continues, new formal aspects and new elements of reality are 
revealed. And this knowledge grows because the results found on the path have an 
objective value and can therefore be integrated into further knowledge not only by 
ourselves but also by others: knowledge is public, is shared. Only in this sense are they 
true acqui sitions, although this integration cannot be understood in terms of positive 
accumulation only but as a continuous process of self-correction and updating. The 
paths leading to some results may be different but they represent the form of inferen- 
tial-hypothetical reasoning that is the way in which the mind accommodates to the 
relations that exist between cognitive principles and results, between universals and 
particulars (experiences).
In other words, the results of an investigation that is freely undertaken show their 
autonomous validity with respect to the investigators, who therefore may recognize 
knowledge as being ultimately founded on something else, which is in a strong sense 
ulterior and not totally knowable, but only partially perceived during one’s cognitive 
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journey. Such an apparently paradoxical state of affairs may be seen as the virtuous 
circle through which human beings progressively realize their very own nature: in long-
ing for universality, we transcend our biological constitution and individual perspec-
tive, yet we discover the truth that we were looking for as something that is independ-
ent of our own personal efforts (Peirce, 1902).
Properly speaking, self-canalization is the activity through which both the connec-
tions between the mental and the physical world, as well as between the mental and the 
formal ones are strictly entrenched in the intersubjective dimension that constitutes the 
whole of human culture. Human culture essentially consists of a process of symbolic 
sharing and information interpretation through which we are able to canalize our own 
development (thanks to education and transmission of culture to the next generations) 
and, to a certain extent, even our own evolution (through our ability to reshape the 
environment and to give rise to new forms of artificial contexts playing the role of 
frameworks for our species). Then, culture is the ecological niche of our species (or 
of our genus) (Auletta, 2013c). 
This clearly shows that, although conventional, culture is never arbitrary, being an-
other manifestation of the fundamental connection between contingent paths of ex-
ploration and results endowed with universal validity that is the quintessence of hu-
manity. This process of transmission is only possible when the new generations to be 
educated trust the previous generations and believe in their traditions in order to reach 
further, more pondered and grounded beliefs, so that the process of self-canalization 
can be seen as a dynamical integration of tradition and novelty starting from a lower 
belief and ending in a higher belief or also going from empirical, less rational assent to 
higher and socially shared rational assent.
4. Some lessons
Resuming, the new image that current scientific developments give of man is a be-
ing in which (i) biology and culture are more entrenched than it was though before, (ii) 
mental and bodily dimensions cooperate in a form that leads us very far away from 
traditional dualistic or even monistic (and often reductionist) approaches, as it is evi-
dent in the case of action’s choice, (iii) the studied continuity but also specificity of 
humans relative to other primates helps us to understand the emergence of humanity 
as a complex process in which (iv) embodiment with neural reuse, «improvisional» 
intelligence and a cultural niche have played a crucial role, (v) the inter-subjective di-
mension offers a way out from solipsism that has dominated most of philosophical 
schools. I think that these results constitute a robust basis for developing a robust 
philosophical-anthropological reflection. 
In particular, we can focus on some very important lessons that can be drawn from 
what has been previously said:
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•	 Humanity	is	a	genus	and	not	a	biological	species.	In	other	words,	humanity	cannot	
be identified with homo sapiens. This is evident by the fact that Neanderthals, who 
likely are not our direct ancestors (although there can have been some forms of 
interbreeding), had a cult of dead, used symbolic objects, had a neural capacity 
higher than ours. So, we cannot deny that they are humans although they are not 
sapiens. I would enlarge these reflections. I would suggest that we can speak of hu-
manity in the precise moment in which our ancestors (about 6.2-6.5 Millions of 
years ago [Mya]) have separated from other primates. It is clear that for a long time 
our ancestors had no scripture (which started about 6 kya), no modern spoken 
language (likely started 60-70 kya), even no symbolic communication (likely start-
ed 200 kya), no advanced cognitive abilities (a revolution that took place likely 
400-500 kya), no capability to produce artefacts according to previous plans (sym-
metric bifacials are about 800 kya), no capability to work systematically on stones 
for producing very rough tools (about 2,5 Mya). Nevertheless, I see no reason to 
deny that we deal here with a growing humanity. In fact, all these changes and 
mutations are specifically human and are not shared with any other species. More-
over, we need to consider their accumulation. It is clear that basic structural or bi-
ological-functional modifications came first. In fact, higher cognitive functions 
and even fine-tuning in those biological functionalities themselves can only rely on 
a more basic biological substrate. It is like for children during development. A child 
is a human being from its conception (it presents from the start characters that are 
unique to our species), but it acquires several capabilities across its development 
and in conjunction with several biological transformations that somehow in part 
«recapitulate» phylogenetic ones. We now have the intellectual capabilities to un-
derstand the universe as originated from the Big Bang and what are the rules of an 
inferential process. However, if our ancestors (400-500 kya) had not discovered the 
fire, we certainly could not do that. We are on their shoulders and we are their 
heritage, in a sense that is very different from the phylogenetic thread that connects 
us with other biological species. 
•	 In	fact,	what	is	unique	to	this	evolution	is	the	transcendence	of	the	biological	di-
mension towards the constitution of a cultural niche, a symbolic and mental dimen-
sion, in general towards a growing autonomy from the pre-given environmental 
substrate of our life (improvisational intelligence). In other words, humanity is char-
acterized by a process of self-transcendence. This is why biological changes have 
accelerated during the cultural epoch (the last 40,000 years). In other words, we are 
not a species biologically fixed and relative stable as the other ones, but our cognitive 
and cultural niches pushes us to a constant process of physical, intellectual and spir-
itual elevation. 
•	 In	this	process,	our	biological	substrate,	our	body	is	not	removed	or	eliminated	but	
integrated in such a process, somehow «transfigured». 
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5. The current turn
5.1 What are the current developments in biology and biotechnologies 
We assist now to a major turn in the history of our race. Many countries of the 
world (especially the US and those pertaining to the European Union) are investing 
growing quantities of funds in the new technologies for enhancing humanity. A refer-
ence document of the EU on these issues is Making Perfect Life: Bio-Engineering (in) 
the 21st Century, Interim Interim Study - Monitoring Report of the European Parlia-
ment.1
Among the most important current technologies concerning human enhancement 
I recall:
 
a. Prosthetic devices of Information-Technology (IT) kind for improving biological-
neurological capabilities;
b. Bio-engineering (redesigning and rebuilding biological systems, from engineering of 
tissues up to interventions in the genetic and epigenetic pathways) with the aim of 
bettering biological-neurological capabilities, lengthening human life span, regener-
ating organs or parts of the body thanks to (non-embryonic) stem cells (this allows 
to pass from a «repair medicine» to a «regenerative medicine»);
c. Neuromodulation and brain-computer interface for stimulating neurological-men-
tal capabilities.
 
The collective name for this field of studies is NBIC (Nanotechnology, Biology, In-
formation, Cognition). These technologies represent an important turn in the history 
of civilization: for the first time we are developing technological means for addressing 
the human body not only for medical purposes (curative practices, elimination of dys-
functions or impairments, which are still included in the agenda of regenerative medi-
cine), but rather for enhancing the capabilities of the human being as such. Such a turn 
will obviously raise several fundamental anthropological issues about the nature and the 
destiny of humanity also because of the influences that it will unavoidable have on fu-
ture generations and their lifestyle. A number of crucial environmental as well as social 
and cultural issues are also involved.
Already this sparse information let understand that something really very important 
is going on. It is likely that our societies and humanity as a whole are making choices 
that will have effects on our descendants for the next centuries. Choices from which it 
will be very difficult if not impossible to step back. No philosopher or no theologian 
1 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/divers/stoa/2011/471570/IPOL-STOA_DV(2011)471570_EN.
pdf.
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can remain indifferent to this. To do not intervene in one way or the other is also a 
choice and this can also have very long-ranging consequences.
5.2 In which sense they represent a challenge to humanity
These developments represent both a continuity and discontinuity with the previ-
ous history: on the hand, they reinforce the tendency of our race to self-canalization. 
In fact, if it is question of engineering our body, this means that we shall have the 
practical means fro programming our own evolution. On the other hand, there is an 
evident discontinuity: culture imposed biases on our biological evolution only in 
an indirect way. On the contrary, if we are able to plan our evolution, this means that 
we can transform ourselves purposefully. It is clear that such a situation may present 
very big dangers for the individuals and the society, especially considering the huge 
amount of interests of economic, political and military kind that are beyond these 
developments. However, we need here a careful and objective analysis. I stress here 
some points that deserve the highest attention:
•	 The	idea	that	technology	can	be	cured	with	technology.	In	other	words,	we	cannot	
step back from technological developments but can try to improve them along di-
rections that make technology more human- and environment-friendly. In fact, on 
our backs there is also an important responsibility towards future generations and 
still emerging countries in a double sense of the word: certainly we should avoid a 
too bigger impact on the environment and society but we should also try to improve 
economy in order to favour the well-being of the whole world population. Obvi-
ously, this also raises several problems of distribution and about the maximal level at 
which this growth can be sustained. 
•	 The	great	 stress	 that	 these	 technologies	have	on	 the	 improvement	of	 life.	This	 is	
something that cannot leave us indifferent. The promotion of life is always positive 
in itself. Moreover, to improve life duration will help greatly our species. It is proved 
that one of the main differences between our ancestors and the Neanderthals was 
not the degree of encephalization (in fact, as mentioned, the Neanderthal had a big-
ger brain than the Sapiens), but the fact that our ancestors, making use of the divi-
sion of labour, left in the camps children together with women and elder people. 
Now, the fact that elder people were there was a consequence of the choice that only 
a small group of selected hunters (young males) dealt with the hunt of big mam-
mals, a very dangerous activity, sparing, in this way, to the rest of the population 
injuries and allowing an elongation of life. Now, the contact between children and 
elder people allowed the former to grow in a protected environment in which they 
could assimilate the lessons and the traditions accumulated in long time span, there-
fore favouring their intellectual development. In our society, there is a characteristic 
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underestimation of elder people. This may be connected with the fact that in the last 
centuries active life lasted until few years before the death, so not allowing elder 
people (who in general were weakened physically and intellectually by their previous 
work) to update their knowledge with current progress. Now, we have a generation 
of elder people who live much more after their retirement but the society has found 
so far no way to profit of their capabilities, with the consequence that most of them 
live their time in the mean as «free time». It is likely that a further improvement of 
life duration will offer new possibilities to have novel kinds of social and cultural 
engagement for helping the new generations. The next generations cannot throw 
away such a treasure of experiences and capabilities. But obviously, this also sup-
poses people in a perfect state of mental and physical health, and here is where the 
technologies of human enhancement can make an important difference. 
•	 The	great	emphasis	on	the	further	intellectual	(cognitive)	development	of	humanity.	
This is crucial, since the cognitive development has up to now represented a bridge 
between the bodily-biological substrate and the higher spiritual manifestations of 
humanity. Although we cannot expect a linear evolution in this sense in the future, 
it is clear that in the mid-long time span an empowerment of the cognitive faculties 
of humanity will also make easier to deal with the highest scientific, philosophical 
and theological speculations. In other words, human enhancement can, in long time, 
help very much a substantial progress of the spiritual life of humanity. 
•	 The	 connection	between	 information	and	biology	 is	 crucial	 (Auletta,	2011a).	 In	
fact, one of the questions I shall raise here is the notion of biological, psychological 
and social control. At any level of complexity, control is generally related to top-
down processes, which is one of the main concepts introduced in NBIC: indeed, in 
order to exert control, a system must have the possibility to choose at least between 
operations that are accepted and those that are rejected. This strongly connects the 
issue of control and the issue of information (in fact, to control a system demands 
to be able to monitor its changes).
It is clear that there are also some dangers. These developments were prepared since a 
long time by a visionary philosophical-cultural movement called transhumanism (Au-
letta, Colagè and D’Ambrosio, 2013). Since their own view have changed with the time 
and the movement finds itself in a still magmatic process, the best is to make reference 
to their website that is updated and gives links to further documentation (http://hu-
manityplus.org/). The most relevant of these critical points appear to me to be:
1. The goal of transhumanism is to overcome humanity. The name of the web site 
(Humanityplus) is characteristic: should this «plus» mean to make an enhanced hu-
manity or to bring humanity to a post-humanity? In general, the main tendency seems 
to be the second one. I have stressed that our ancestors are not less humans than we are, 
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notwithstanding the immense progresses that we have made in between. So also, for 
the future, I would suggest that whatever our descendants will be or do, they will al-
ways be human. In other words, as I have stressed, humanity is characterized by self-
trascendence. I think that to say differently, would allow a dangerous development: to 
distinguish between super-humans who have been biologically engineered and humans 
(but actually, under-humans) who have not. 
2. Another critical issues is that many transhumanists expect from technology new 
ways to take decisions, as super-intelligent devices with which we are connected could 
take better decisions than ourselves. I think that this is a huge misunderstanding about 
the ways in which decisions are taken. In fact, one thing are the computational ca-
pacities. Already current computers can compute better than us, and it is likely that 
future generations of computer can score much better. Another thing is to take deci-
sions. The specificity of human decision making (what makes so relevant to have a 
consciousness) (Auletta, 2011a, Chaps. 18 and 22) relatively to all other animals and 
also to computer is that we can take decisions when the data at our disposal are insuf-
ficient. This is crucial for the very complex world in which we live. Since this is a mat-
ter of principle, no computational technique alone can circumvent this problem. 
Moreover, any decision, especially when it concerns whole societies, demands the 
evalua tion of so subtle questions (and especially of ethical aspects and consequences) 
that decisions cannot be taken in the same way in which we can choose a pen. This is 
why we need to improve the cognitive and moral capabilities of humans and not dream 
of machines that could replace us, although they can obviously assist us. 
3, For this reason, the emphasis put on the fusion between humanity and IT is too 
big (the so-called cyborg). Certainly, many IT can be very helpful. But we cannot move 
towards a direction that would make humans dependent on devices. This would be a 
regress and not a progress. 
4. Another critical point is the following: many transhumanists still think that we 
need to change the social and religious structures. In particular, some are clearly anti-
religious. I think that this in unnecessary, and if transhumanism will really become a 
view that everybody could share since it works for the progress of humanity it would 
be suitable to remove all ideological accessories. 
5.3 How Philosophy and Theology can deal with them
Summarizing, under many different points of view, these developments put in 
question what to be or to become human could mean. I think that philosophers and 
theologians should follow very carefully these developments. We cannot make vio-
lence to these developments or hinder them even in the case in which we would seri-
ously envisage this possibility. The progress of humanity needs to be spontaneous and 
demands a lot of time (likely many centuries and perhaps some thousands of years) 
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and patience. The cultural modifications are the most difficult ones to introduce and 
to stabilize. 
I think that philosophers and theologians could be very helpful from two different 
points of view:
1. Trying to focus on the most relevant aspects of humanity involved here. The pre-
sent paper can be considered a contribution into this direction, but still further work 
needs to be done. 
2. We should help the society to find some criteria for dealing with these develop-
ments. The fundamental criterion seems to me to be the capability by the individual 
and the society to assimilate these transformations. Neither the individual, nor the 
society can lose the self-control on its own processes. No transformation should be ap-
proved that makes the individual or the society more dependent on whatsoever agency. 
Briefly speaking, any new technological development needs to be understood and 
judged in reference to its intrinsic capability to keep top-down control on the involved 
processes by both the individual (at several levels of complexity and containment, from 
cellular control through control related to whole organs up to neural and psychological 
aspects) and the society (again at several levels of complexity and containment, from 
specific social groups or layers up to national and supranational wholes).
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